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FIXING FALSE TRUTHS: RETHINKING
TRUTH ASSUMPTIONS AND FREE-EXPRESSION
RATIONALES IN THE NETWORKED ERA
Jared Schroeder*

ABSTRACT
The First Amendment makes no mention of truth. Assumptions about truth,
however, have become the foundations for free-expression rationales, the very bases
for such freedoms in a democratic society. The Supreme Court gradually, over time,
wedded Enlightenment assumptions about truth to the marketplace of ideas rationale
for free expression. This Article examines, in light of massive, widespread adoption
of networked technologies and AI and Supreme Court decisions that have undermined the distinctive role of truth, whether truth should be removed or replaced as
a crucial, justifying concept in freedom of expression. The Article examines the marketplace approach’s history and assumptions, as well as alternative, philosophical
understandings of truth and how the Supreme Court has communicated understandings about truth in its opinions. The Article concludes by outlining how installing revised truth assumptions, those that align more with discursive and phenomenological
understandings, will better protect these freedoms, as well as the flow of information, in the twenty-first century.
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INTRODUCTION: A RUDIMENTARY BUT CRUCIAL QUESTION
The forty-five words that comprise the First Amendment make no mention of
truth, yet understandings about truth have dictated how free expression safeguards
have been defined, rationalized, and explained in the United States since the Supreme Court’s first free-expression-related decisions.1 This is not an accident; most
of those involved in crafting the amendment in the late eighteenth century were
children of the Enlightenment, people who generally assumed truth was objective
and the same for all and that people were rational and capable of governing themselves.2 Similarly, a line of prominent Justices, beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes,
wed their understandings and justifications for free expression to the marketplace
of ideas theory, which assumes truth will generally succeed and falsity will fail in
a relatively unregulated exchange of ideas.3 Thus, the marketplace of ideas approach,4
with its foundations in truth and its powerful role in how the Court has communicated how it understands First Amendment safeguards for free expression, has essentially been the needle that has sewn the idea of truth into the tapestry of the First
Amendment, where it has persisted, largely as a result of the inertia Enlightenment
assumptions have carried into the twenty-first century.5
Such a reliance on truth in interpreting the First Amendment and rationalizing
free expression can perhaps find its nexus point in Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams
v. United States in 1919, when he explained, “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”6 He continued, concluding, “That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”7 While earlier that year, in a trio
of cases, the Court had squarely addressed the First Amendment for the first time, it
was in Abrams that truth and the First Amendment were first intertwined.8 They
1

See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (tracing the evolution
of First Amendment rights analysis).
2
R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke,
but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1051, 1074–76 (1995); Steven D. Smith, Recovering (from) Enlightenment?,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1264–66 (2004).
3
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–4; Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and
the Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1350–51 (1991).
4
See Ingber, supra note 3, at 5.
5
See id. at 2–5.
6
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7
Id.
8
Compare Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919), Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), with Abrams, 250 U.S. 616.

2021]

FIXING FALSE TRUTHS

1099

have thus remained.9 Justice Louis Brandies stitched truth further into the First Amendment’s justifications for expression in his famous concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California nine years later.10 He concluded the Framers believed the right “to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth.”11 Truth became even more a part of the First Amendment’s
fabric when Justices rejected Minnesota’s truth and good motives requirements when
they overturned a nuisance publication law in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson in
1931.12 The decision marked the first instance in which the Supreme Court struck down
a law because it violated the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment.13
This foundational and precedential stitching, however, has started to fray and
snag in the networked era. Truth is under substantial pressure.14 AI is being used to
flood the marketplace with certain ideas and to push citizens from participation.15
At the same time, deep fakes, videos that portray individuals as saying and doing
things they never said or did, threaten to undermine citizens’ ability to believe their
own eyes and ears when it comes to making conclusions about what is happening
in the world around them.16 As these phenomena expand, individuals are becoming
9

See generally Sugarman, 249 U.S. 182; Debs, 249 U.S. 211; Schenck, 249 U.S. 47.
274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
11
Id. at 375.
12
283 U.S. 697, 709–10, 721–23 (1931).
13
Id. at 722–23.
14
See generally Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False
News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146 (2018); Adi Robertson, How to Fight Lies, Tricks, and Chaos
Online, VERGE (Dec. 3, 2019, 9:04 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/3/20980741
/fake-news-facebook-twitter-misinformation-lies-fact-check-how-to-internet-guide [https://
perma.cc/NDK5-AWQA]; Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Truth and Misinformation Online, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017
/10/19/the-future-of-truth-and-misinformation-online/ [https://perma.cc/9Y4E-C9D4].
15
See, e.g., Molly K. McKew, How Twitter Bots and Trump Fans Made #ReleaseTheMemo
Go Viral, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/04
/trump-twitter-russians-release-the-memo-216935 [https://perma.cc/J3QB-UVTV]; Tess Owen,
Nearly 50% of Twitter Accounts Talking About Coronavirus Might Be Bots, VICE (April 23,
2020, 1:07 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dygnwz/if-youre-talking-about-corona
virus-on-twitter-youre-probably-a-bot [https://perma.cc/DAM3-ZB7B]; Kate Starbird, Disinformation’s Spread: Bots, Trolls and All of Us, NATURE (July 24, 2019), https://www.nature
.com/articles/d41586-019-02235-x [https://perma.cc/3BYK-2VB7].
16
Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1758 (2019) (“It leverages
machine-learning algorithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio records of actual
people and enables the creation of realistic impersonations . . . .”); Paul Chadwick, The Liar’s
Dividend, and Other Challenges of Deep-Fake News, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/22/deep-fake-news-donald-trump-vladimir-putin [https://perma
.cc/FEC9-RTG9] (July 23, 2018, 11:53 AM); Robert Chesney, Danielle Citron & Hany Farid,
All’s Clear for Deepfakes: Think Again, LAWFARE (May 11, 2020, 4:19 PM), https://www.law
fareblog.com/alls-clear-deepfakes-think-again [https://perma.cc/UHR4-LGDB].
10
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increasingly fragmented and polarized as they settle into their self-made information
echo chambers, spaces where intentionally false information, whether it is composed
and shared by humans or AI, or suggested via tech giants’ powerful and secretive
algorithms, is often accepted and circulated by other community members because it
reinforces pre-existing narratives within the group.17 Thus, truth, in the choice-rich,
virtual environments that host much of democratic discourse in the networked era,
has become increasingly based upon the beliefs and narratives that dominate online
communities, rather than the types of universal, objective realities Enlightenment
thinkers and those who have subscribed to their beliefs conceptualized.18 As a result,
marketplace theory and its Enlightenment foundations regarding truth and rationality
also become a problematic tool for rationalizing free expression.19 In other words, the
nature of truth, as it was understood when the First Amendment was constructed and
later interpreted, in many ways diverges from how it exists in the networked era.20
As massive, widespread adoption of such technologies has splintered society’s
conclusions about what is true, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Alvarez, in the name of Enlightenment assumptions about truth, limited the practical
role truth plays in First Amendment law.21 In Alvarez in 2012, the Court deliberately
separated limits on general false factual claims from those that connect with defamation, invasion of privacy, or “other legally cognizable harm.”22 Whereas the Court
had traditionally drawn a line between false statements of fact and “false ideas,”
17

Itai Himelboim, Stephen McCreery & Marc Smith, Birds of a Feather Tweet Together:
Integrating Network and Content Analyses to Examine Cross-Ideology Exposure on Twitter,
18 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC’N 154, 166–71 (2013); W. Lance Bennett & Shanto
Iyengar, A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing Foundations of Political Communication, 58 J. COMMC’N 707, 720–22 (2008); see MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK
SOCIETY 2–5 (2d ed. 2000). Scholars who tracked pro- and anti-vaccine groups on Facebook
found “both narratives are subjected to selective exposure, and that the more active a user is on
Facebook the smaller is the variety of sources they tend to consume.” Ana Lucía Schmidt,
Fabiana Zollo, Antonio Scala, Cornelia Betsch & Walter Quattrociocchi, Polarization of the
Vaccination Debate on Facebook, 36 VACCINE 3606, 3610 (2018). Thus, via algorithms and
personal preference, the worlds of these groups shrank and separated over time. See id. at
3609–11. Cass Sunstein contends that when citizens communicate only with like-minded
others, they can only become more extreme in their positions, not less. See CASS SUNSTEIN,
#REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 69–71 (2017).
18
For a discussion of the discrepancy between the Enlightenment conceptualization of truth
and reality, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3–7 (1989);
Ingber, supra note 3, at 15–18.
19
See Ingber, supra note 3, at 15–18.
20
See id. at 85–91.
21
See 567 U.S. 709, 727–30 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“[H]is right to make those [false]
statements is protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech . . . .”); see also
Casey G. Jones, Borrowing Valor: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez and the Validity of
the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 315, 341, 345–46 (2014) (highlighting that
the Alvarez decision “protect[ed] knowing false statements of fact”).
22
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719 (plurality opinion).
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Justices blurred that line by concluding limitations on false factual claims that do not
connect with existing areas that limit expression, such as fraud, should be protected.23
In the case, this meant the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalized making
false claims of having earned military honors, was unconstitutional because it placed
the government in the rather Orwellian position of determining what is true.24 Justice
Kennedy, in writing for the Court, concluded, “Truth needs neither handcuffs nor
a badge for its vindication.”25 While using handcuffs and badges as metaphors created
a memorable line in the opinion, the Court’s rationale in the decision fundamentally
altered the relationship between truth and the First Amendment.26 The precedent
expanded the Court’s longstanding conclusion that “there is no such thing as a false
idea” to a broad spectrum of factual claims, thus blurring the false idea versus false
fact distinction the Court constructed in the 1970s and ’80s.27 In a broad set of cases,
the Court had distinguished between facts and ideas, concluding “demonstrable
falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful
statements”28 and “[t]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”29
Alvarez raised questions, which the Court has not addressed in subsequent decisions,
regarding whether such statements about the limited First Amendment value of false
statements of fact remain relevant during a time in which misinformation and disinformation flow more readily than they have at any other period.30 Ultimately, the
handcuffs and badges imagery used in Alvarez doubled down on the Court’s traditional,
Enlightenment assumptions about truth’s supremacy over falsity and the rationality
of citizens.31 Justices invested further in assumptions that generally rational individuals will be able to separate truthful statements from intentionally false ones that are
meant to be believed,32 rather than simply those that are parody or satire.33
The widespread adoption of networked technologies and the AI entities that have
come with them were not the first phenomena to create rips and tears in the truth
23

Id. at 719, 729–30.
Id. at 723–24 (citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949)) (referencing
the Ministry of Truth that was part of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four).
25
Id. at 729.
26
Id. at 723–30.
27
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974); see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–73 (1976); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
28
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
29
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
30
For further discussion of “false fact” statements as low value speech, see Brian Schlect,
Case Note and Comment, The New York Times Solution to the Ninth Circuit’s ‘Stolen
Valor’ Problem, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 175, 182–84 (2011).
31
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 728–29.
32
See id. at 727 (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”).
33
For the definition of parody, see Kyonzte Hughes, Parody & Satire, FREEDOM F. INST.
(Sept. 13, 2002), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/free
dom-of-speech-2/arts-first-amendment-overview/parody-satire [https://perma.cc/F986-YUCU].
24
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assumptions that have been woven into the heart of Enlightenment thought, the
marketplace of ideas, and, therefore, how the First Amendment is interpreted.34 Legal
scholars and philosophers have long questioned the assumption that truth will succeed
and falsity will fail in a competition of ideas.35 First Amendment scholar C. Edwin
Baker concluded, “truth is not objective,” explaining “people individually and collectively choose or create rather than ‘discover’ their perspectives, understandings, and
truths.”36 Similarly, legal scholars have emphasized that information reaches people
with different intensity and frequency and that people bring certain personal biases
to the information they encounter, making it unlikely that truth can be generally
objective and the same for all.37 Such legal-scholarship-based conclusions align with
broader philosophical critiques of absolute or objective truth.38 American pragmatist
William James, a friend of Justice Holmes’s,39 explained, “Purely objective truth,
truth in whose establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying
previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role whatever, is nowhere
to be found.”40 He continued, “The reasons why we call things true is the reason why
they ARE true, for ‘to be true’ MEANS only to perform this marriage-function.”41
This idea that truth is made within each person, rather than found from without, has
been supported by numerous thinkers.42 American philosopher Richard Rorty, in his
34

First Amendment Timeline, FREE SPEECH CTR., https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment
/page/first-amendment-timeline [https://perma.cc/JR5C-3ZRM] (last visited May 6, 2021).
35
JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
MASS MEDIA, at xiii–xiv (1973); Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test of Truth: The “Marketplace
of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV. 383, 431–33 (2014); BAKER, supra note 18, at
12–14, 16; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 592–93 (1980) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (critiquing marketplace assumptions).
36
BAKER, supra note 18, at 12–13.
37
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 761, 776–77 (1986) (questioning the marketplace theory and individuals’ ability to
evaluate information).
38
See generally STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A
GOOD THING, TOO (1994) (describing how institutions effectively shape and restrain what is
expressible within their purview to enhance productivity and freedom—through focus, comes
order and freedom of action).
39
Marcia Jean Speziale, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James, Theodore Roosevelt,
and the Strenuous Life, 13 CONN. L. REV. 663, 672–73 (1981) (describing at great length their
friendship and relating how William “James described Holmes as ‘the only fellow . . . I care
anything about,’ adding that even if Holmes was perhaps too intellectual, ‘he sees things so
easily and clearly and talks so admirably that it’s a treat to be with him.’”).
40
WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 64
(1907).
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., William Berry, The Truth Will Not Set You Free, PSYCH.TODAY (May 6, 2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-second-noble-truth/201205/the-truth-will-not
-set-you-free [https://perma.cc/H6W6-QWUX].
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critique of the Enlightenment, contends, “[R]eality does not have a permanent structure, nor does the human mind. So, although sentences do not change their truthvalues as time goes by, there is nevertheless no quasi-object called Truth, which stays
the same for all eternity.”43 Political theorist Hannah Arendt contended the Enlightenment was a reaction to the realization that the human senses were not capable of
accurately accounting for the outside world.44 As a result of this revelation, people
came to mistrust their senses and sought to find tests, measures, and processes to
determine truth.45 Ultimately, Arendt concluded truth emerges via discourse among
free people, a conclusion the fellow German thinker Jürgen Habermas, and American pragmatist John Dewey, independently developed, with some philosophical differences.46 Arendt also highlighted phenomenological thought, questioning the ability
of individuals to escape their own biases and prejudices to see the world objectively.47
She referred to people as living in “the prison of [their] own mind[s]” and to the
difficultly of seeing without biases as similar to the challenge of “jumping over our
own shadows.”48 Thus, the dominant conceptualization of truth within U.S. legal
thought has found substantial criticism within legal and philosophical scholarship.49
Taken together, these precedential, technological, social, and philosophical concerns about the nature and role of truth in how First Amendment protections are
rationalized raise questions about whether it should remain a foundational pillar of the
marketplace approach and for how free expression is conceptualized more broadly.50
Truth is not a part of the First Amendment’s wording—it was added, largely via the
marketplace approach.51 In light of massive, widespread adoption of networked technologies and AI, as well as Supreme Court decisions that have undermined its distinctive role, should truth be removed or replaced as a crucial, justifying concept in
freedom of expression? Would other concepts, such as meaning, language, or understanding, be more appropriate guides for rationalizing free expression in the
43

Richard Rorty, The Continuity Between the Enlightenment and ‘Postmodernism,’ in
WHAT’S LEFT OF ENLIGHTENMENT?: A POSTMODERN QUESTION 19, 29 (Keith Michael Baker
& Peter Hanns Reill eds., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT’S LEFT OF ENLIGHTENMENT?].
44
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 259–63 (2d ed. 1998).
45
See id. at 259–64.
46
See id. at 164; JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
INQUIRY 158–59 (1946); 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
170–71 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) (providing examples of these thinkers’ understandings
of emergent truth via discourse).
47
ARENDT, supra note 44, at 10–11, 288.
48
See id. at 10, 288.
49
See BAKER, supra note 18, at 12–13; Rorty, supra note 43, at 29; ARENDT, supra note
44, at 10–11, 164, 259–67, 281; DEWEY, supra note 46, at 158–59; 2 HABERMAS, supra note
46, at 170–71.
50
See, e.g., Joo, supra note 35, at 431–33.
51
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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choice-rich twenty-first-century information environment? Part I of this Article
examines these rudimentary, yet crucial questions, first considering the marketplace
concept and Enlightenment thought. Part II expands the discussion to exploring the
concept and nature of truth more broadly, before Part III examines the Supreme
Court’s relationship with truth. The Conclusion draws the conceptual building blocks
from the preceding Parts together to construct a revised set of foundational assumptions regarding truth and its place in rationalizing free expression.
I. THE MARKETPLACE METAPHOR
Marketplace theory’s Enlightenment-sourced foundational building blocks, as
well as its relationship with the First Amendment, are often understood as originating in Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams.52 This Article takes the important step of
separating marketplace theory’s origins from the Enlightenment, instead identifying
a drawing together of the two over time, a process that started in earnest in the 1960s.53
The informal, gradual marriage between the theory and Enlightenment assumptions,
rather than the theory being initially constructed upon such assumptions about truth
and human rationality, bears important implications regarding how the marketplace
should be interpreted as the traditional building blocks of the theory struggle to hold
in the networked era.54 This Part examines the historical relationship between Enlightenment assumptions and the marketplace approach before considering the process
in which the marketplace and Enlightenment assumptions were brought together by
the Court.55 This Part also delves into legal scholarship that questions the bedrock
assumptions of the theory.56
A. Children of the Enlightenment
The fact that jurists installed Enlightenment-based foundations beneath the
marketplace of ideas comes as little surprise when it is considered within the context
of the nation’s founding generation of thinkers.57 Alexander Hamilton, John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, and, perhaps most notably, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison,
were all substantially influenced by Enlightenment ideas.58 As one scholar explained,
52

See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31.
W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM
& MASS COMMC’N Q. 40, 42–43 (1996).
54
See id. at 41–43.
55
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 12–13 (1996).
56
See infra Sections I.D–E.
57
See RAKOVE, supra note 55, at 12–13.
58
DARREN STALOFF, HAMILTON, ADAMS, JEFFERSON: THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT
AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 3 (2005).
53
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the Framers’ ideas regarding how to construct the new republic were based on “their
absorption in the political theory of the Enlightenment.”59 The same author contended
they applied such ideas to the unique problems they faced in post-colonial America.60
More explicitly, Jefferson’s “Life, Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness” contention in
the Declaration of Independence overlaps significantly, though without citation,
with John Locke’s “lives, liberties, and estates,” which he wrote as part of a broader
discussion on government in 1689.61 Later in the same passage, Locke provided a
blueprint for democratic society, explaining, “Wherever, therefore, any number of
men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the
law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there, and there only, is a political, or civil
society.”62 He concluded that in these conditions, a “commonwealth” is created.63
Such Enlightenment ideas were prominent in Jefferson’s first inaugural address in
1801, where he referred to truth succeeding and falsity failing among rational individuals.64 Jefferson stated, “If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve
this Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is
left free to combat it.”65 Madison, who drafted the initial speech and press provisions
that would become the First Amendment, has also been associated with Lockean
thought, as well as Scottish thinker David Hume, the late Enlightenment philosopher
who, though his work partly inspired it, died only weeks after the Declaration of
Independence was signed.66
Before Locke, British philosopher and central Enlightenment thinker John Milton
rationalized freedom of expression in words that substantively overlap with Justice
Holmes’s conclusions regarding the First Amendment in Abrams in 1919.67 In 1644,
Milton contended, “Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting

59

See RAKOVE, supra note 55, at 13.
See id.
61
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT) AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 63 (J.W. Gough ed., 1976).
62
LOCKE, supra note 61, at 45.
63
Id. at 44.
64
See generally 33 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON: 17 FEBRUARY TO 30 APRIL 1801, at 148, 148–52 (Barbara G. Oberg ed., 2006).
65
Id. at 149.
66
Roy Branson, James Madison and the Scottish Enlightenment, 40 J. HIST. IDEAS 235, 236
(1979); Mark G. Spencer, Hume and Madison on Faction, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 869, 869–70
(2002); see 3 CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, DAVID HUME: MAJOR CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERTARIAN
THINKERS 20 (John Meadowcroft ed., 2013); Donald Livingston, Hume and America, 4 KY.
REV. 15, 16 (1983).
67
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION WITH AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PASSAGES
AND OTHER PROSE WORKS 50 (George H. Sabine ed., 1951).
60
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to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put
to the worse in a free and open encounter?”68 He also contended, “Where there is
much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many
opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making.”69 Justice Holmes,
in finding Jacob Abrams and his fellow protestors had a right to communicate their
anti-government messages, explained:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.70
Justice Holmes continued by concluding this “at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”71 His words in Abrams, however, were written without footnotes or other
attribution.72 In other words, the introduction of the marketplace metaphor into
American legal thought did not come with an explicit association with Enlightenment assumptions.73 In searching for implicit connections, the evidence of a strong
Enlightenment influence on the jurist is tenuous.74 Justice Holmes, in his letters during
the period, did not mention Enlightenment thought, though he commented to a
friend, in a February 1919 letter, that he re-read British thinker John Stuart Mill’s On
Liberty, calling Mill a “fine old sportsman.”75 Upon his death in 1935, a catalogue
of Justice Holmes’s estate listed ten books by Mill, as well as ten works by Milton.76
None of the Milton works were Areopagitica.77 Instead, as examined in the ensuing
Section, Justice Holmes espoused a philosophy of truth that contradicted the Enlightenment associations that have come to be wedded to the marketplace of ideas
and his well-known dissent in Abrams.78
68

Id.
Id. at 45.
70
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71
Id.
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
75
Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Feb. 28, 1919) (on file
with Harvard Law School Library Digital Suite), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh
/index.php/item/42882402/12 [https://perma.cc/78N2-PNDQ].
76
ESTATE OF JUSTICE HOLMES: THE LIBRARY 435–36 (on file with Harvard Law School
Library Digital Suite), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/42864698/59
[https://perma.cc/UD9L-G8GW].
77
Id. at 436.
78
See infra Section I.B.
69
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B. Holmesian Skepticism
Despite language that overlapped significantly with one of the Enlightenment’s
central thinkers regarding individual liberty and free expression, as well as his documented appreciation for Mill, Justice Holmes rejected Enlightenment assumptions
about truth in many of his legal and scholarly writings.79 Instead, he often communicated understandings about truth that aligned more with the pragmatic ideas of his
one-time friend William James, despite his distaste for the term “pragmatism.”80 In
The Common Law, a book he published in 1881, he contended, “The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.”81 Such a conclusion, which was followed
by examples of factors that influence how laws are interpreted, aligns more with
James’s conclusions about truth being the outcome of personal experience than Enlightenment-founded assumptions.82 Biographers have contended Justice Holmes’s
ideas about truth were substantially shaped by the Civil War, during which he was
shot on three different occasions.83 Such conclusions are supported in his legal opinions
and scholarship.84
In Natural Law, he opened the article, which was published in 1918, a year before
he wrote Abrams, with a direct attack on objective, universal truth.85 He explained,
“Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things that
79

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
Holmes rejected being labeled as a pragmatist. He also often spoke negatively about
James, the father of American pragmatism, though they grew up together and were friends in
early adulthood. See Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Mar. 29,
1917), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL
OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 37, 37 (Richard A. Posner
ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES]; see also LOUIS MENAND,THE METAPHYSICAL
CLUB 337 (2001).
81
See HOLMES, supra note 79, at 1.
82
See id.; JAMES, supra note 40, at 223–24 (writing in his Lecture VI.—Pragmatism’s
Conception of Truth that: “[w]hen new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the
past tense, what these judgments utter WAS true, even tho no past thinker had been led there.
We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards. The present sheds
a backward light on the world’s previous processes. They may have been truth-processes for
the actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the later revelations of the story.”).
83
Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529,
535–36 (1951); MENAND, supra note 80, at 38, 41, 46; see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Diary,
Balls Bluff, in TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., 1861–1864, at 27, 27–28 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946).
84
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Fraternity of Arms: Remarks at a Meeting of the
20th Regimental Association (Dec. 11, 1897), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 80, at
73; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Alice Stopford Green (Oct. 14, 1911), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 80, at 3. For his journal entry after he was wounded in the war,
see also Holmes, supra note 83, at 25–28.
85
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
80
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were not so.”86 Then, in wording that mirrors the bitter disagreement between North
and South—a disagreement that dramatically influenced his early adulthood, he stated,
“[W]hile one’s experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself,
recognition of how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor souls,
may be equally dogmatic about something else.”87 The article continues by explaining everyone is “fighting to make the kind of a world that we should like—but that
we have learned to recognize that others will fight and die to make a different world,
with equal sincerity or belief.”88 Within his conclusions about human convictions
and decisions about what individuals determine is true, he included a recognition
that truth is subjective.89 He reinforced such conclusions in 1929, when he explained
to a friend that he was a “bettabilitarian.”90 He explained, “I believe we can bet on the
behavior of the universe in its contact with us. We bet we can know what it will be.”91
He referred to objective truth as “a mirage” in a 1929 letter to longtime friend Harold
Laski, a socialist who was at the time a professor at the London School of Economics.92
Though it has received less attention, the themes Justice Holmes communicated
about personal biases and experiences being dominant in determining truth surround
his use of the marketplace metaphor in the Abrams dissent.93 He explained: “Every
year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system . . . we should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe . . . .”94 He also recognized that it is natural for individuals to seek to “sweep
away all opposition” and he refers to “fighting faiths.”95 Thus, while the heart of the
marketplace’s primordial use in the Supreme Court’s vocabulary does not include
86

Id.
Id. at 41.
88
Id.
89
See id. at 41–43.
90
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 80, at 108.
91
Id.; see also David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint,
44 DUKE L.J. 449, 474 (1995). See generally Felix S. Cohen, The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 3 (1948).
92
See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Jan. 27, 1929), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 80, at 107. Laski lectured briefly at Harvard, but his Marxist
ideas, which were unpopular in post–World War I America, led to his departure. KENNETH R.
HOOVER, ECONOMICS AS IDEOLOGY: KEYNES, LASKI, HAYEK, AND THE CREATION OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 38, 46–47, 49, 70, 74 (2003). During this time, however, he became
friends with Justice Holmes, as well as then–law professor Felix Frankfurter and Walter
Lippmann. Id. at 38, 47.
93
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see
also Holmes, supra note 85, at 41–43.
94
See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
95
Id.
87
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any explicit association with Enlightenment thought, it does include clear associations with Justice Holmes’s more pragmatic conceptualizations of truth, which find
substantial support in his personal and legal scholarship—particularly in Natural
Law, which was published a year before Abrams was written.96 These observations
aside, there is little doubt the marketplace approach has come to be intertwined with
Enlightenment assumptions about truth and rationality.97
C. The Marketplace-Enlightenment Merger
No date or precedent marks an official installation of Enlightenment values as
the foundational assumptions of marketplace theory.98 The Court’s opinions immediately after Abrams illustrate the relationship was not immediate.99 In fact, Justice
Holmes’s marketplace metaphor languished, receiving little attention, until the
1960s.100 Justice Holmes contributed substantially to that languishing.101 At least half
a dozen cases within the decade that followed Abrams provided opportunities for him
to apply and build around the marketplace he outlined in 1919.102 Yet, given several
96

Compare id., with Holmes, supra note 85, at 43 (writing more conservatively during
his court opinions about the features of speech and conceptions of truth than he does in his
own jurisprudential scholarship).
97
See STALOFF, supra note 58, at 81–82, 86–87.
98
See Ingber, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing how while John Milton’s and John Stuart
Mill’s ideas were ultimately ported into Constitutional jurisprudence, perhaps beginning with
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), there is no official
endorsement of enlightenment values by the Court); see also Harold J. Berman, The Impact
of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 312,
322–23 (1992).
99
The first reference to the phrase “marketplace of ideas” actually occurs thirty years later,
in United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953), after decades of relatively repressive rulings
on speech.
100
See Hopkins, supra note 53, at 41–42.
101
For the rest of the 1920s, although Holmes found in favor of expansive free speech—
for example, in Gitlow v. New York, U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting), he and
Justice Brandeis argued that even “indefinite” advocacy of overthrowing the government should
be protected speech—Holmes did not mention further Enlightenment values or begin structuring a specific rule framework for parsing speech rights during his remaining tenure on the
Court. See G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 465–66 (1992) (writing “[w]hen one
looks over the Progression of Holmes’ free speech jurisprudence, one despairs of finding a
coherent theoretical pattern or squaring his stance with positivist premises or with conventional
theories of judicial deference to the will of the majority. At times Holmes seemed to exhibit
a minimalist conception of speech . . . at other times he seemed to inflate protection for speech
to the most important and imperative of constitutional principles.”).
102
See generally Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251
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opportunities, he made no mention of it.103 The Court heard three cases that involved
anti-war speech, all similar to Schenck v. United States and Abrams from the year
before, in 1920.104 The Court, citing Abrams in each, upheld the convictions without
mentioning the marketplace metaphor or exploring the depths of First Amendment safeguards on free expression.105 Justice Brandeis dissented in each case, with Justice
Holmes joining his opinion in two of them.106 In Schaefer v. United States, which
involved a German-language newspaper’s anti-war statements, the Court communicated limitations on expression must be carefully weighed.107 The Court explained, “[T]he power of Congress to interfere with the freedom of speech and of
the press must be judged by an exercise of reason on the circumstances.”108 Justice
Brandeis, with Justice Holmes joining, contended the articles could not be understood as a clear and present danger.109 Justice Brandeis made similar arguments in
the other two cases.110 Thus, fewer than six months after the Abrams dissent, neither
the Court nor the dissenters—in three different cases—employed the marketplace
approach or rationalized their arguments using Enlightenment-related language about
the furtherance of truth or the rationality of individuals when given the opportunity
to encounter ideas.111
Similarly, in 1921 in United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing
Company v. Burleson, Justices Brandeis and Holmes wrote separate dissents regarding
the Court’s decision to allow the postmaster general, under the Espionage Act, to make
content-based decisions regarding which status of mail newspapers should receive.112
U.S. 466 (1920); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). All three of these cases, decided
a year after Abrams, provided Justice Holmes opportunities to build upon the marketplace
concept or to associate it with Enlightenment ideas. He made no mention of either. For two
other examples, see United States ex. rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
103
See Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Schaefer, 251 U.S. at
482 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
104
Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482
(Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
105
Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Schaefer, 251 U.S. at
477; Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 332.
106
Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482
(Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
107
251 U.S. at 482–83 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
108
Id. at 474 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
109
Id. at 482–83 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
110
Pierce, 252 U.S. at 271 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 338
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
111
See Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253; id. at 271 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Schaefer,
251 U.S. at 477; id. at 482–83 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 332;
id. at 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112
255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 436 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Neither mentioned the marketplace or included Enlightenment ideas as part of their
arguments.113 Justice Holmes came the closest to drawing these ideas together in his
dissent when he concluded, “The United States may give up the Post Office when
it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of
free speech as the right to use our tongues.”114 Similarly, in Gitlow v. New York in
1925, Justice Holmes dissented when the Court upheld criminal charges against
Benjamin Gitlow for publishing the “Left Wing Manifesto.”115 Justice Holmes,
though he did not mention the marketplace concept or Enlightenment ideas, expanded on the exchange of ideas concept.116 He explained, “Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief
outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth.”117 He
continued, contending Gitlow’s views were not a danger and “[i]f in the long run the
beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way.”118 The passage marks the closest Justice
Holmes came to returning to the marketplace ideas before retiring.119 When thought
of together, the two cases, Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company and
Gitlow, provided clear chances for the esteemed Justice to expand and clarify the
marketplace concept or to reinforce Enlightenment ideas.120 While communicating
concerns for free expression in both, he did not associate them with the marketplace
or Enlightenment.121
Even in Whitney v. California five years later, in which Justice Brandeis penned
one of the Court’s most powerful arguments for free expression in his concurring
opinion, Abrams went uncited and the marketplace concept was not specifically
discussed.122 Justice Brandeis’s reasoning, which Justice Holmes joined, included
significant Enlightenment influences.123 Importantly, he interconnected Enlightenment ideas with understandings of the Framers’ intent.124 He explained, “Those who
113

See generally id. at 417–36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 436–38 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
114
Id. at 437 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115
268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
116
See id. at 673.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See id.
120
See id. See generally Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S.
407 (1921).
121
See Gitlow, 652 U.S. at 672–73 (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Burleson, 255
U.S. at 436–38 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
122
See 274 U.S. 357, 372–80 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring).
123
See id. at 375–77.
124
See id.
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won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free
to develop their faculties,”125 a concept that aligns with Enlightenment understandings about the role of society.126 He continued, “They believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth.”127 Thus, Justice Brandeis brought substantial Enlightenment
concerns into his opinion, but did so without drawing upon marketplace terminology.128
Similarly, in the Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson prior restraint decision in 1931—
the first instance when the Supreme Court struck down a law because it violated the
First Amendment—Abrams and the marketplace concept went unmentioned.129 Enlightenment ideas, however, were incorporated when Chief Justice Hughes published the entire letter the Continental Congress sent to Quebec in 1774.130 The letter
was constructed upon Enlightenment assumptions regarding truth and human
rationality.131 In regard to free press, the letter explained:
[I]t is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of
those yielding the proper fruits. And can the wisdom of this
policy be doubted by any who reflect that to the press alone . . .
the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained
by reason and humanity over error and oppression.132
The letter was written primarily by John Dickinson, a Quaker, former president of
Pennsylvania and Delaware, and a member of the Continental Congress.133 The
125

Id. at 375.
See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL,ON LIBERTY 27 (1859) (“The only freedom which deserves
the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”).
127
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring).
128
See id.; see also MILL, supra note 126, at 27.
129
See generally 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding that the First Amendment protected speech
without referencing any sort of Enlightenment philosophical framework or the marketplace
of ideas).
130
Id. at 717–18 (quoting Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec (Oct. 26,
1774) (available at https://archive.org/details/cihm_36354/page/n5/mode/2up?ref=ol&view
=theater) [hereinafter Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec]); see John R. Vile,
Continental Congress: Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, FIRST AMEND.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/862/continental-con
gress-letter-to-the-inhabitants-of-the-province-of-quebec [https://perma.cc/88JW-LFRH] (discussing the history of the Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec).
131
See Near, 283 U.S. at 717–18 (quoting Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec,
supra note 130).
132
Id. at 718.
133
See Vile, supra note 130.
126
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Court’s decision in Near interjected Enlightenment ideas into the Court’s record, via
the Quebec letter.134
Importantly, the correlation between the Supreme Court striking down the law
in Near because it limited First Amendment freedoms and the intermingling of the
marketplace of ideas and Enlightenment thought was reinforced in later cases.135 In
other words, the marketplace metaphor became marketplace theory when the Justices used Enlightenment ideas to rationalize supporting free expression arguments
in the cases they faced.136 This process started in earnest with two important free
expression decisions just before World War II.137 In Thornhill v. Alabama in 1940,
the Court struck down a state law that criminalized picketing.138 Justice Murphy, in
writing for the Court, applied the clear and present danger test from Schenck, then,
in rationalizing the Court’s reasoning in striking down the law, explained censoring
speech provides “no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for
acceptance in the market of public opinion.”139 Earlier in the passage, he explained,
“The safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing of an informed and
educated public opinion with respect to a matter which is of public concern.”140 A
year later, in Bridges v. California, in which the Court overturned contempt of court
convictions against a group of newspapers, Justice Frankfurter, who understood
himself as a disciple of Justice Holmes’s judicial approach, explained in his dissent,
“A trial is not a ‘free trade in ideas,’ nor is the best test of truth in a courtroom ‘the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”141 In
rationalizing his stance that the courts must be protected, Justice Frankfurter explained, “Of course freedom of speech and of the press are essential to the enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those who wield power.”142 After World
War II, in United States v. Rumely, Justice Douglas made a passing connection between Enlightenment thought and the marketplace in a concurring opinion that
134

See Near, 283 U.S. at 717–18 (quoting Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec,
supra note 130).
135
See generally Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941); United States v. Rumley, 354 U.S. 41 (1953).
136
See Hopkins, supra note 53, at 48 (describing how the Justices make discrete, situationspecific schematics for upholding free speech rights rather than one overarching framework);
see also STALOFF, supra note 58, at 3–4; RAKOVE, supra note 55, at 13.
137
See generally Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88 (reversing a conviction of a president of a local
union for violating a law preventing labor picketing under First Amendment grounds); Bridges,
314 U.S. 252 (reversing a contempt of court finding against a union leader who published his
correspondence with the Secretary of Labor during a litigation).
138
310 U.S. at 91, 106.
139
Id. at 105.
140
Id. at 104.
141
314 U.S. 252, 283 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
142
Id. at 284.
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supported the Court’s decision to reject a House committee’s claim that it could compel
an author to provide the names of those who had bought many of his books.143
Justice Douglas explained:
Like the publishers of newspapers, magazines, or books, this
publisher bids for the minds of men in the market place of ideas.
The aim of the historic struggle for a free press was “to establish
and preserve the right of the English people to full information
in respect of the doings or misdoings of their government.”144
In Thornhill and Bridges, and then in Rumely, Justices for the first time since Abrams
brought Enlightenment ideas together with specific consideration of the marketplace
of ideas.145
Cases such as these were the heralds of the precedential wedding between the
marketplace concept and Enlightenment ideas, the ceremony for which started in the
1960s.146 While the marketplace concept was cited fifteen times during the fortyyear span between 1919 and 1959, the Justices referred to it a dozen times in the
1960s, thirty-five times in the 1970s, and thirty-seven times in the 1980s.147 In constructing rationalizations for expanding free expression protections, the Justices
drew from cases that referred to the marketplace and other decisions that espoused
Enlightenment ideas, ultimately intertwining them in support of their reasoning.148
Foremost among these cases was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Justice Brennan
drew upon Justice Brandeis’s Enlightenment-rich concurring opinion from Whitney,
in which he contended the founders believed “in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion,” with documentation of Madison’s Enlightenment-related
concerns about the power of the government to limit the flow of information.149 He
did so within the same passage where he wrote the decision’s most memorable line:
“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”150 The
passage also refers to the First Amendment as being created to “assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
143

345 U.S. 41, 56–58 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 56.
145
See id. at 56–58; Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 88, 91, 106; Bridges, 314 U.S. at 283–84; see also
Hopkins, supra note 53, at 48; STALOFF, supra note 58, at 3–4; RAKOVE, supra note 55, at 13.
146
See generally Hopkins, supra note 53 (discussing the evolution of the marketplace of
ideas in depth from the 1910s to the present).
147
Id. at 42.
148
See id. at 43–48; see generally Kelso, supra note 2 (arguing that the Enlightenment
values act almost like the silent hand shaping the general trend of modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, especially with respect to speech rights).
149
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–74 (1964) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
150
Id. at 270.
144
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by the people.”151 A year later, in the less-celebrated Lamont v. Postmaster General
decision, Justice Brennan added a concern for the safety and flow of the marketplace
to his ideas from Sullivan.152 He did so in a concurring opinion regarding the Court’s
decision to strike down a law that gave the Postal Service the power to halt the
distribution of Communist political information.153 He explained, “The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to
receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers.”154 Such a concern about the health of the marketplace gained
increasing attention in the decisions that followed.155
Justice Douglas communicated concerns about the well-being of the marketplace
in Ginzburg v. United States in 1966.156 While the Court upheld obscenity charges
against Ralph Ginzburg, Justice Douglas contended people are rational and capable
of deciding what they wish to encounter and what is true.157 He concluded, “[T]he
First Amendment allows all ideas to be expressed—whether orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repulsive. I do not think it permissible to draw lines between the ‘good’ and the
‘bad.’”158 He continued, “The theory is that people are mature enough to pick and
choose, to recognize trash when they see it . . . and, hopefully, to move from plateau
to plateau and finally reach the world of enduring ideas.”159 Three years later, in
perhaps the Court’s most explicit expression of Enlightenment ideals as the foundation beneath the marketplace metaphor, the Court concluded in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, “It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”160 Justices surrounded
this conclusion with citations from Justice Holmes’s original use of the marketplace
metaphor in Abrams and to the area in Sullivan where Enlightenment ideas and the
marketplace concept met.161 Thus, the Court’s statement in Red Lion can be understood as the completion of Justices’ gradual installation of Enlightenment ideas as the
marketplace’s foundational underpinnings.162 At the same time, the statement marked
the beginning of a split among Justices regarding the nature of the marketplace, a
concern that first appeared in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Lamont.163
The Court in Red Lion constructed more explicit rationales for “preserving” the
151
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153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
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See 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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marketplace of ideas, leading Justices to debate how the marketplace should operate
regarding the flow of ideas, particularly the discovery of truth.164
D. Expanding vs. Protecting the Marketplace
The Court’s decision in Red Lion, in the name of the marketplace of ideas and
allowing more voices, upheld the government’s right to compel radio stations to
provide air time to speakers who ordinarily would not have such access to the forums.165 The Court reasoned the First Amendment’s job is to “preserve” the marketplace of ideas, therefore citizens must have access to the public airwaves.166 Such
a concern aligns with Enlightenment reasoning that more ideas, rather than fewer,
increase the chances truth will succeed and falsity will fail when rational citizens can
evaluate a wide spectrum of perspectives.167 The opinion, however, particularly the
use of the word “preserve,” had unintended consequences on marketplace theory.168
It placed within the precedential record an idea that steps can be taken to protect the
marketplace, a crucial concern in the twenty-first century.169
The protective role the Justices invoked was not immediately problematic, particularly in cases that followed in the early 1970s.170 In New York Times Co. v.
United States, Justice Stewart employed protective reasoning in rationalizing the
Court’s decision to reject the government’s call to restrain newspapers from publishing information about the Pentagon Papers.171 The decision emphasized protecting
the marketplace from the government restrictions of information.172 He explained in
his concurring opinion that, “in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical
public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government,”
people must have access to a wide range of information.173 A year later, in Healy v.
James, the Court rejected a state university’s decision to refuse a political group’s
application to found a chapter on its campus.174 In the name of protecting the marketplace, a unanimous Court determined, “The college classroom with its surrounding
environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional
164
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ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”175
In both instances, protecting the marketplace aligned with citizens having access to
the broadest possible range of ideas, which aligns with Enlightenment thought.176
Starting a year later, in CBS v. Democratic National Committee, justices diverged
regarding what it meant to protect the marketplace.177 The Court concluded radio
stations do not have to accept all paid political advertising, finding the marketplace
would not be well served if the “system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially
affluent.”178 Justice Brennan, the author of the Court’s opinions in Sullivan and
Lamont several years prior, disagreed with the majority’s rationales, which centered
around protecting the marketplace.179 He explained that Justice Holmes’s dissent in
Abrams had “become a dominant theme in applying the First Amendment to the
changing problems of our nation.”180 Justice Brennan continued, drawing upon the
Red Lion rationale, by contending a full range of ideas must be freely expressed on the
public airwaves.181 He also associated his findings regarding a wide-open marketplace with Enlightenment ideas.182 He explained, “Our legal system reflects a belief
that truth is best illuminated by a collision of genuine advocates.”183 Thus, in CBS,
the expansive marketplace approach and a concern for protecting the marketplace
itself—and the exchange of ideas it facilitates—diverged with the two concerns
finding themselves on opposing sides of the Court’s reasoning.184
These divisions among Justices’ legal philosophies regarding the marketplace
became more explicit in the First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission decisions in 1978 and
1980.185 In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law that limited the extent to which corporations could take part in political debate regarding referendums.186
Building upon the commercial speech cases that were decided in the preceding
terms,187 the Justices reasoned corporations have the potential to contribute valuable
information to the marketplace of ideas.188 Justice Powell, in writing for the Court,
175
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explained, “[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information
from which members of the public may draw.”189 The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision,
found the law limited an expansive, open marketplace of ideas by discriminating based
on the nature of the speaker.190 Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist communicated concern for the marketplace of ideas in their dissenting opinions, contending
the law helped protect the space for a free exchange of ideas from the nonhuman
nature of corporate speakers.191 Justice White, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Red
Lion nine years earlier, concluded, “Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously
threatening the role of the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of
ideas.”192 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the nonhuman nature of corporations,
referencing the Court’s decisions from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century regarding corporate speech.193 He contended the marketplace was for human
communicators, explaining:
The free flow of information is in no way diminished by the
Commonwealth’s decision to permit the operation of business
corporations with limited rights of political expression. All
natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher sovereign
than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in
political activity.194
Two years later, in Central Hudson, the same diverging visions regarding fostering
an expansive, inclusive marketplace or preserving and safeguarding the space from
harmful influences divided Justices.195 Justice Powell, again writing the Court’s
opinion, contended government restrictions on public utility advertising limited the
information—the range of ideas—within the marketplace of ideas.196 Chief Justice
Rehnquist once again dissented, this time specifically citing Enlightenment thinkers
Adam Smith, John Stewart Mill, and John Milton, alongside Justice Holmes’s dissent
189
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in Abrams.197 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the Framers did not intend to give
“a merchant’s unfettered freedom to advertise in hawking his wares as a ‘liberty’ not
subject to extensive regulation in light of the government’s substantial interest in
attaining ‘order’ in the economic sphere.”198 Instead, calling upon Jefferson’s first inaugural speech, which he contended included the marketplace concept Justice
Holmes referenced in Abrams, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the marketplace should
be regulated to protect it from misuse.199
The same divergent narratives were central to the divided Court’s conclusions in
Citizens United v. FEC in 2010. Justice Kennedy, in writing for the Court, directly
criticized approaching the marketplace as something that must be protected from
distortive influences, such as corporate spending or candidates being influenced by
those who support their campaigns.200 In rationalizing these conclusions, Justice
Kennedy contended the Court’s decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
in 1990, which found corporations receive certain advantages that can threaten the
marketplace, was incorrect.201 He explained the decision improperly considered
protecting the market at the expense of fostering a free exchange of ideas, finding,
“Austin’s antidistortion rationale would produce [a] dangerous, and unacceptable,
consequence.”202 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, reinforced the concern for protecting
the marketplace from Austin, and drew in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
which was decided in 1986, contending “the integrity of the marketplace of political
ideas” must be protected.203 He contended legal tools, such as the Act in question in
Citizens United, must be employed so the marketplace can function properly, essentially protecting it from harmful effects.204 In particular, he emphasized that corporations, as nonhuman actors, are a danger to the marketplace as it was originally
conceived.205 He explained, the law “reflects a concern to facilitate First Amendment
values by preserving some breathing room around the electoral ‘marketplace’ of ideas,
the marketplace in which the actual people of this Nation determine how they will
govern themselves.”206
It is often easy to think of the marketplace of ideas as monolithic, but Justices, in
rationalizing their decisions in a variety of cases, have associated different concerns
and characteristics with the theory.207 While the majority of the Court usually contends
197
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the marketplace rationale for free expression is derived when the largest possible
amount of information is made available, regardless of the nature or position of the
speaker, a variety of dissents have communicated concern for safeguarding the marketplace, thus protecting a space for human discourse.208 Such a conclusion allows for
limited government regulation of free expression, opening avenues for the marketplace,
and its truth assumptions, to be reconsidered in the networked era.209
E. The Imperfect Marketplace
The marketplace, particularly its truth assumptions, has faced substantial criticism
from legal and communication scholars.210 The substance and reasoning behind such
criticisms provide important insights regarding the way truth has been understood
and sewn, via the marketplace, into how the First Amendment has been understood.211
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s most explicit critique of the marketplace’s truth
assumptions came from Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Central Hudson.212
He contended the marketplace approach does not guarantee truth will succeed or
falsity will fail.213 He also disagreed with the majority’s use of the metaphor to
contend nearly any type of speech, including commercial and corporate, cannot
generally be regulated.214 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, “There is no reason for
raised across contexts defending or defining free speech protections, and commenting on the way
the “marketplace of ideas” as a metaphor has affected the evolution of legal protections for
speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720–23 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
123 (1973) (holding that “the marketplace of ‘ideas and experiences’ would scarcely be served
by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent, or those with access to
wealth”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 810 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(claiming that political contributions “may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the
First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 570 (1980) (holding that a regulation that prohibits
utilities from advertising the benefits of electricity consumption to raise their own revenue
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (raising concerns that conglomerates could upend and circumvent the First Amendment protection afforded
to media corporations by buying them out, were these conglomerates’ speech regulated).
208
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believing that the marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any more
than there is to believe that the invisible hand will always lead to optimum economic
decisions in the commercial market.”215 While he cited Baker’s critique of the
marketplace’s assumptions in his dissent,216 his conclusions overlapped more with
legal scholar Jerome Barron’s harsher criticism of the marketplace approach from
1967.217 Barron contended, “Our constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of free expression, a belief that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is freely accessible.”218 Barron, whose ideas the Court generally rejected when he used them to
argue Tornillo’s case in Miami Herald v. Tornillo in 1974,219 explained “if ever there
were a self-operating marketplace of ideas, it has long ceased to exist.”220
Broadly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Barron, as well as other scholars, have shared
a concern that the marketplace’s Enlightenment foundations simply are not capable
of carrying the weight of First Amendment interpretation and rationalization that
Justices have come to place upon it.221 In particular, scholars have found the truth
assumptions of the theory problematic.222 Baker concluded, “[T]he assumptions on
which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests are almost universally rejected.”223
He explained, “[T]ruth is not objective.”224 Of course, Baker was not rejecting all
truth, simply the Enlightenment version of objective truth upon which the marketplace has come to rest. Baker posited the marketplace concept must be revised to
remove objective truth with “the view that people individually and collectively
choose or create rather than ‘discover’ their perspectives, understandings, and
truths.”225 Legal scholar Frederick Schauer came to similar conclusions but associated them with human rationality concerns. He wrote, “[O]ur increasing knowledge
about the process of idea transmission, reception, and acceptance makes it more and
more difficult to accept the notion that truth has some inherent power to prevail in
the marketplace of ideas . . . .”226 Similarly, legal scholar Stanley Ingber explained,
“In order to be discoverable, however, truth must be an objective rather than a
subjective, chosen concept.”227 Perhaps Baker summed up these concerns when he
215

Id.
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concluded, “[F]reedom of speech may be defensible, [but] not because of the marketplace of ideas’ supposed capacity to discover truth.”228
In identifying these primarily truth-oriented concerns about the marketplace’s
assumptions, legal scholars have also drawn in questions about Enlightenment principles regarding human rationality and the structure of society.229 Scholars have
recognized each individual brings certain biases into any encounter with information.230 Such biases undermine the likelihood that rational individuals will generally
identify the same, universal “truth” as the idea that succeeds in the marketplace.231
Baker reasoned this is “precisely because the value-oriented criteria—interests, desires,
or aesthetics—which guide the development of perceptions, appear ungrounded,
incapable of objective demonstration.”232 Conversely, when it comes to the message,
rather than the receiver, a different set of concerns arise regarding human rationality
and social structures.233 As media scholars Robert Schmuhl and Robert Picard noted,
the marketplace might function when there are only a few sources of information,
but when there are countless sources, as there are in the twenty-first century, the
approach’s assumptions struggle.234 There are inherent inequalities in the frequency
and intensity in which individuals encounter messages, and the extent to which certain
communicators have access to conveying ideas in the marketplace make the theory’s
axioms unlikely to come to fruition.235 The authors explained, “[T]he belief of Milton
or Holmes in a self-righting principle that yields truth is not only chancy but also
doubtful.”236 These concerns have been exacerbated in choice-rich, fragmented virtual
spaces, where individuals tend to construct echo-chamber-like networks.237 Certain
228

BAKER, supra note 18, at 24.
Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy
of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006); Leonard M. Niehoff &
Deeva Shah, The Resilience of Noxious Doctrine: The 2016 Election, the Marketplace of Ideas,
and the Obstinacy of Bias, 22 MICH. J. RACE & L. 243, 269 (2017); see Vincent Blasi, Holmes
and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2.
230
Bambauer, supra note 229, at 651; Niehoff & Shah, supra note 229, at 269; Blasi,
supra note 229, at 2.
231
See generally Govind Persaud, When, and How, Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law?,
32 MINN. J.L. & INEQ. 31 (2014) (arguing that we should be more sensitive to human frailties in
rationality when designing legal regimes than invoking philosophical principles); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 17, at 72 (highlighting that individuals usually retain their original stances on issues,
even in the face of new ideas and evidence, with the implication being that persuasion is often
a feature of saturation, rather than rhetoric).
232
BAKER, supra note 18, at 13.
233
See Robert Schmuhl & Robert Picard, The Market Place of Ideas, in THE PRESS 141,
152 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2005).
234
See id. at 146.
235
See id. at 145–47.
236
Id. at 147.
237
Himelboim et al., supra note 17, at 166–71; CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 3–4; Bennett
& Iyengar, supra note 17, at 720.
229

2021]

FIXING FALSE TRUTHS

1123

messages will reach communities more often, because of the sources of information
and individual narratives within them, while others do not reach them at all.238 At
the same time, certain messengers have more resources to share messages with
greater frequency and to package messages in more attractive ways.239
All of these concerns about the marketplace point to the theory’s Enlightenment
foundations, particularly regarding the nature of truth.240 Historian David Hollinger,
in considering Enlightenment thought more generally, critiqued the era’s efforts to
resolve uncertainty by manipulating reality and oversimplifying complex social
structures.241 He explained, “The Enlightenment, it seems, has led us to suppose that
all people are pretty much alike.”242 He also emphasized that it “blinded us to uncertainties of knowledge by promoting an ideal of absolute scientific certainty.”243
It is these concerns about the marketplace’s underlying foundation in Enlightenment
thought, rather than the marketplace itself, that scholars, in a variety of fields, have
emphasized.244 Thus, these criticisms, when considered in light of how Enlightenment
ideas regarding truth have been installed as foundational supports to the marketplace
approach, create a need for revised foundational assumptions for the Court’s most
dominant rationale for free expression.245
II. TRUTH AND ITS SYNONYMS
Despite the influential role Enlightenment-founded assumptions regarding the
universal, discoverable nature of truth have had on U.S. social and political structures, they are not alone when it comes to conceptualizations of truth, particularly
in regard to the flow of information and the development of understanding.246 Using
238
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reasoning similar to the criticisms of Enlightenment truth discussed in the preceding
Section, thinkers have constructed understandings of truth that account for the fundamental inability of human senses, and the human experience more generally, to
make sense of the world in the way it truly is.247 German thinker Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, for example, explained, “[T]here is a boundary between cognition
and the Absolute that completely separates them.”248 He continued, “[I]f cognition
is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being, it is obvious that the use of an
instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets
out to reshape and alter it.”249 Whether an individual is the instrument through which
information is decanted into truth or a tool or mediator acts between, Hegel and many
others have contended the absolute being or nature of something cannot be understood by human senses or the tools people create to measure phenomena in the
world.250 They contend meaning-making is a self-referential process that is unavoidably colored by human biases.251 Heidegger explained, “Neither the ontical depiction
of entities within-the-world nor the ontological Interpretation of their Being is such as
to reach the phenomenon of the ‘world.’ In both of these ways of access to ‘Objective Being,’ the ‘world’ has already been ‘presupposed.’”252 Such realizations have led
to more discursive and pragmatic approaches to how truth is understood.253 This section examines conceptualizations of truth that are applicable to the problem of how free
expression should be rationalized in democratic society, particularly in the twentyfirst century. To do so, this Part explores meaning-making via phenomenological conceptualizations of truth, highlighting the place of prejudices and biases and the
interaction that occurs between a person and information. It also looks at discursive
thought, primarily as it has been understood by Habermas and Dewey, and American
pragmatism, primarily through James’s foundational work on the topic.254 In examining these concerns regarding the nature of truth, this section provides conceptual
building blocks regarding how the truth assumptions within free expression rationales can be revised or replaced.255
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A. Truth as a Self-Referential Process
Phenomenological thinkers understand truth as an emergent process that is
fundamentally personal, referential, and biased.256 Thus, while Enlightenment conceptualizations of truth assumed a sameness among individuals regarding human
rationality and generally universal, externally discoverable truth, phenomenologists
contend meaning-making occurs as a type of dialogue between the individual and
their being—that which defines them—and the being or nature of the idea or text
they encounter.257 Thus, truth emerges in the give and take between a person—and
all that influences their world view—and the information source.258 Truth, in this sense,
can also be recognized as meaning, understanding, or consensus.259 German thinker
Martin Heidegger explained, “Looking at something, understanding and conceiving
it, choosing, access to it—all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry,
and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers,
are ourselves.”260 Hans-Georg Gadamer, who was one of Heidegger’s students, for
a time alongside Hannah Arendt, emphasized, “A person who is trying to understand
a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as
some initial meaning emerges in the text.”261 Thus, rather than generally complete
truths and falsities encountering each other in a marketplace that is patronized by individuals who receive them in relatively similar ways, these thinkers understood truth
as a dialogue between the individual and the text or idea that is colored by foreknowledge and prejudice.262 Such an approach is not compatible with Enlightenment-founded
truth assumptions.263 Arendt likened the impossibility of a person encountering an
idea in its true, primordial form to “jumping over our own shadows.”264 In this sense,
Democracy in Habermas and Dewey, 15 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 277, 291–92 (1992) (critiquing Habermas’s and Dewey’s conception of discourse as excessively narrow).
256
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individuals cannot escape themselves and their biases to see the world as it truly
is.265 Arendt associated this concern with how Galileo’s discovery of the telescope
forever changed human understanding.266 The tool allowed humans to extend their
senses and to realize many truths people were once certain of, because they had
perceived them with their senses, were incorrect.267 The telescope introduced a fundamental skepticism regarding the truth-finding capabilities of the human senses.268
Enlightenment thinkers sought to mitigate this doubt by creating systems and using
tools to establish certainty.269 Phenomenological thinkers contend, however, these tools
and systems merely manipulate understanding, they do not reveal truth.270 Arendt
explained, “Instead of objective qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of the . . . universe . . . man encounters only himself.”271
Gadamer looked more deeply into the biases humans project upon their conceptions of the world.272 He explained this phenomenon: “[W]e understand ourselves
through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident
way in the family, society, and state in which we live.”273 Thus, the nature of things
and ideas people encounter is masked by a haze of their personal biases and prejudices.274 Phenomenologists assume, in order for a person to encounter an idea in its
true form, they must complete the impossible task of removing themselves from the
line of history of which they are irreconcilably a part.275 Since people cannot escape
the socializing, historical forces that define their being, their best hope is to identify
and acknowledge their biases and prejudices when encountering ideas. Heidegger
paid particular attention to this concern in his primary work, Being and Time.276 He
concluded, “[O]ur first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions,
but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures
in terms of the things themselves.”277
Such conclusions regarding the lenses through which individuals encounter the
world have led thinkers to question the human tools people have created to measure
human experience and create “truth.”278 Gadamer explained, “The experience of the
265

See id.
Id. at 259–61.
267
Id. at 259–60.
268
See id.
269
See id. at 257–58.
270
See id. at 260–61.
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Id. at 261.
272
GADAMER, supra note 247, at 278.
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Id.
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HEIDEGGER, supra note 251, at 195.
275
GADAMER, supra note 247, at 4.
276
See generally HEIDEGGER, supra note 251 (recommending means for effectively removing bias from one’s conception of history and the inherent limits of any such efforts).
277
Id. at 195.
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E.g., GADAMER, supra note 247, at 4.
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sociohistorical world cannot be raised to a science by the inductive procedure of the
natural sciences.”279 Arendt critiqued the Enlightenment-founded search for absolute
scientific certainty, concluding “it will be difficult to ward off the suspicion that this
mathematically preconceived world may be a dream world where every dreamed
vision man himself produces has the character of reality only as long as the dream
lasts.”280 She also warned that the tools and processes people use to find truth always
threaten to put “man back once more—and now even more forcefully—into the prison
of his own mind, into the limitations of patterns he himself created.”281
The central concerns of phenomenological skepticism substantially overlap with
legal scholars’ concerns regarding the Enlightenment-founded assumptions that have
become the foundation of the marketplace approach.282 Phenomenological thought,
however, constructs an antithesis to positivist truth assumptions, contending truth is
self-made via rational, but worldly, individuals.283 Using the foundations of the phenomenological framework, thinkers have constructed different understandings of how
meaning-making functions.284 The ensuing Sections examine two of those ways.
B. Discourse: A Concern for the Space and Flow of Information
Discursive thought builds upon phenomenological assumptions about the personal,
self-referential nature of truth to put forth ideas for how meaning-making and the
flow of information in democratic society should be understood.285 The approach is
antithetical to the Enlightenment-based marketplace model because it rejects the idea
that truth and falsity compete, instead assuming truth emerges within the individual
and as an agreement or consensus via discourse within a community or society.286 In
this sense, the entire idea of truth, from an Enlightenment perspective, is transformed
to something more akin to meaning-making, understanding, or consensus, rather than
279
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ARENDT, supra note 44, at 286.
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Id. at 288.
282
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283
Id. at 386.
284
See, e.g., Antonio & Kellner, supra note 255, at 281 (listing some of the different
models of meaning-making thinkers have developed).
285
See Schroeder, supra note 282, at 397–99.
286
To see this within Dewey’s writings, see, for example, John Dewey, The Inclusive
Philosophic Idea, in 3 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 41, 49–51 (Jo Ann
Boydston & Patricia Baysinger eds., 1984); John Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before
Us, in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, supra, at 224, 229–30; DEWEY,
supra note 46, at 158. To see this concept in scholarship about Dewey’s ideas, see, for example,
Antonio & Kellner, supra note 255, at 284; Mark Whipple, The Dewey-Lippmann Debate
Today: Communication Distortions, Reflective Agency, and Participatory Democracy, 23 SOCIO.
THEORY 156, 161–62 (2005).
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a discovery or victory of objective, universal truth over falsity.287 Within such a
shift, the discursive approach remains concerned with free expression among rational
individuals but recalibrates the rationales for such protections to emphasize safeguarding the flow of information and the space in which people come together, whether
such a space is actual or conceptual.288 Dewey, a pragmatic thinker who studied Justice Holmes’s writing extensively,289 explained, “[T]he heart and final guarantee of
democracy is in the free gatherings of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and
forth what is read in uncensored news of the day.”290 He continued, these interactions include “gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to
converse freely with one another.”291 Intertwined in Dewey’s conclusions is an understanding that individuals can only reach their full potential as citizens when they take
part in such discourse.292 He explained, “[A] good citizen finds his conduct as a
member of a political group enriching and enriched by his participation in family
life, industry, scientific and artistic associations.”293 Thus, intertwined with concerns
for the flow of information and the space where it occurs, Dewey added an assumption that the individual benefits the community by taking part in discourse.294 Such
involvement, recursively, fulfills the individual.295
Habermas, who was influenced by Dewey’s work, constructed discourse-minded
theories of the flow of information and the space in which such interactions occur.296
Both ideas provide important alternatives to the truth assumptions that currently
reside as foundational rationales for free expression, via the marketplace approach.297
In regard to space, Habermas conceptualized the public sphere, a conceptual place
for discourse that is similar in purpose to the marketplace of ideas, but constructed
it using different philosophical assumptions.298 Habermas defined the public sphere
287

See Schroeder, supra note 282, at 397–99.
See Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, supra note 286, at 227–28
(discussing the value of the free flow of facts and ideas in a democracy).
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See MAX H. FISCH, PEIRCE, SEMIOTIC, AND PRAGMATISM 6 (Kenneth Laine Ketner &
Christian J.W. Kloesel eds., 1986) (noting a time when Dewey “made effective use of two pages
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greatest American philosophers’”).
290
Schroeder, supra note 282, at 227.
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Id. at 228–29.
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DEWEY, supra note 46, at 328.
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Id.
295
See id.
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See generally Antonio & Kellner, supra note 255, at 278–82 (discussing Habermasian
Theory and how it compares to Deweyean pragmatism).
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See id. at 278 (noting the significance of Habermas and Dewey as alternatives to the
Enlightenment tradition, as well as other philosophy thought).
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SPHERE 27–56 (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1993) (discussing the different
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as “the sphere of private people come together as a public.”299 He emphasized, as
Arendt did before him, the public space must be reserved for private people who come
together into the public to discuss pressing matters of concern.300 Habermas contended the public sphere emerged at the same time as the European bourgeois middle
class in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.301 He explained once primarily private, household aspects of business began to emerge in the public as traders, merchants, and crafters established themselves as something altogether different than
the ruling class or the servants who supported them.302 Members of this emerging
middle class formed publics.303 These publics, once formed, were capable of reaching consensus or shared meaning regarding crucial issues and then exerting pressure
on those in power to facilitate change.304 The dynamics of their place in society, as
compared to the traditional servant class, created a new type of actor in society.305
The public sphere that emerged among this class required three primary elements
to function: information, via the press; an engaged public that seeks to find solutions
to the problems facing its community; and limited or no intrusion by the government
in the public sphere.306 Such a conceptualization of the space is similar to Arendt’s
understanding of the polis, which she described as “the organization of the people as
it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people
living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.”307 She emphasized that in the polis, everyone comes as an equal, whereas in private spaces, the head
of the household, or a dictator, determines the community’s path.308
In regard to the flow of information, Habermas and Arendt lamented these spaces
struggle when the ingredients needed to sustain them falter.309 Arendt contended when
private interests, rather than public concerns, overwhelm the public realm, the space
will fail to function properly and democratic freedom becomes threatened.310 Habermas

299

Id. at 27.
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came to similar conclusions, finding that when the public sphere is inundated by news
and information that does not contribute to discourse, it is overwhelmed by people who
are not interested in discourse about matters of concern, or the government intrudes
in the space, it will falter.311 Thus, woven within the discourse-related conceptualization of the space is a concern for protecting the space from destructive elements.312
Concern for the space, as already indicated in Habermas and Arendt’s ideas, is inexorably associated with the flow of information.313 Habermas explained, “an agreement
cannot be imposed from without, cannot be foisted by one party upon the other—
whether instrumentally, through direct intervention into the action situation, or strategically, through indirect influence.”314 Thus, in an emergent, discursive rationale
for free expression, the government must not influence the space or flow of information.315 Furthermore, individuals must come together with the intent to use what they
know to come to a consensus or understanding—a truth—regarding the matter at
hand.316 This emergent truth can then take the form of public opinion and lead to the
people exerting force in order to exact change or address problems.317
C. A Pragmatic Approach
Though Justice Holmes rejected the pragmatist label, particularly when such a
label included him being associated with his old friend William James, the renowned
jurist’s ideas had substantial overlap with American pragmatic thought.318 His dissent in Abrams, just sentences after he invoked the marketplace concept, included
the rationalization that “[e]very year if not every day we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.”319 Such a conclusion aligns
with his famous contention from The Common Law, which was published in 1881,
not long after Holmes’s involvement in the Metaphysical Club, with James, Charles
Peirce, and Chancy Wright,320 that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
311
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JÜRGEN HABERMAS, ON THE PRAGMATICS OF COMMUNICATION 299 (Maeve Cooke ed.,
1998).
315
See id.; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
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experience.”321 This idea that the best anyone can do is wager or bet upon what is
true or that experience determines individual truth—common themes in his writing—
align substantially with American pragmatic thought.322
Pragmatic approaches to truth reject the absolute, universal truth assumptions of
the Enlightenment, but do so in fundamentally different ways than the more emergent understandings found in discursive thought.323 Pragmatic thought identifies a
process-based, fluid approach to truth that acknowledges the limitations of human
experience and personal biases.324 As James described, “Truth HAPPENS to an idea.
It BECOMES true, is MADE true by events. Its verity is in fact an event. . . . Its validity
is the process of its valid-ATION.”325 Such a statement is diametrically opposed to
traditional Enlightenment assumptions about universal, discoverable truth.326 In pragmatic thought, when a person has new experiences, truth can change.327 The new
experience is filtered through the at times rigid biases of previous experience-born
truths, often only adjusting individual conceptualizations slightly.328 James wrote,
“New truths thus are resultants of new experiences and of old truths combined and
mutually modifying one another.”329 Despite such rigidity, truth is still understood
as a liquid rather than a solid.330 It is understood as something that can change shape
based on new influences.331 As with discursive thought, the very meaning of truth
becomes something different in the pragmatic approach.332 It becomes more synonymous with the definition of reality. Thus, while Enlightenment thought conceptualizes truth as monolithic and static and discursive thought understands it as similar
to the definition of meaning, consensus, or understanding, pragmatism provides an
approach to truth that is personal and malleable.333 In this sense, reality is simply old
321
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truth, which each person must square with new experience.334 When experience causes
a person’s reality to change, the truth regarding that subject is revised.335 James contrasted Enlightenment thought with his ideas about pragmatism, concluding, “The
essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all
eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.”336
Such a dynamic, reality- and experience-based understanding of truth, while fundamentally different in its foundation from the marketplace’s traditional assumptions,
shares nearly identical concerns.337 A pragmatic marketplace still places a premium
on free expression, thus safeguarding individuals’ abilities to encounter and form “new
truths” that can cause them to revise their realities.338 The approach, however, shares
more in common with discursive thought in that it does not conceptualize ideas as
being in competition, but rather emphasizes the flow of information and the space
in which it occurs, since it is these aspects of free expression that foster pragmatic
thought.339 James’s foundational understanding of pragmatic thought is far more
individual-based, however, when compared with discursive ideas that assume community involvement.340 Of course, while this Article placed him among discursive
thinkers, Dewey’s ideas span discursive and pragmatic thought.341 Dewey’s pragmatic
thought, which was influenced by his experiences with James’s work and Peirce’s
presence at Johns Hopkins when he was a graduate student there, added a place for
community and citizenship to pragmatic ideals that were generally more inwardly
focused.342 In this regard, Dewey’s ideas create an area of overlap between discursive and pragmatic thought.343 Ultimately, all three of these areas—phenomenology,
discourse, and pragmatism—while made of different materials, provide potential
replacement parts for the troubled, Enlightenment foundations the Court installed
beneath the marketplace approach.
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III. TRUTH, FALSITY, AND THE COURT
Truth has become indelibly interwoven into the fabric of the First Amendment.344
Truth, however, is not a one-dimensional concept.345 As the preceding Part examined,
thinkers have offered understandings of truth that transform its meaning in fundamental ways.346 Meanwhile, the marketplace, as a foundational and rationalizing tool
for free expression, has taken on more than one meaning to Justices.347 Ultimately,
the way Justices have communicated they understand truth, via a variety of decisions
in which truth, falsity, and free expression were central concerns, provides a final set
of building blocks regarding how truth should be conceptualized and applied to
interpretations of the First Amendment during a period of unprecedented technological and social change.348 When examined together, Justices in free-expression cases
communicated three primary concerns regarding the meaning and place of truth and
democratic discourse: 1) concern for the value of the expression,349 2) examination
of the communicator’s intent when sharing the information,350 and 3) the nature of
truth as it applies to the First Amendment.351 Importantly, Justices in these cases did
344
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Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1488 (2019) (discussing how even “high value lies” have
been advanced as a hybrid speech category, as occasionally meritorious speech endeavors).
See generally Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. 1351 (2019)
(weighing considerations of dangerous, misleading speech and free expression).
345
See Dewey, supra note 340, at 8 (illustrating in an example of how an individual child
parses the feeling of burning one’s finger how many layers of thought and processing go into
a simple cognitive assessment of a “true” sensation).
346
See DEWEY, supra note 46, at 158; HABERMAS, supra note 46, at 170. See generally
Crocker, supra note 246 (surveying the range of philosophical debates over the nature of
truth since the Renaissance); JAMES, supra note 40.
347
See Hopkins, supra note 53, at 43.
348
See Ingber, supra note 3, at 3.
349
See, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (disclaiming the value
of false statements as muddling the marketplace of ideas); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 767–77 (1986) (holding the First Amendment did not protect false ideas); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (upholding restrictive regulations of commercial speech, because “much commercial speech is
not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading” . . . that a state
may write laws “dealing effectively with this problem”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (writing “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact”). See
generally Hopkins, supra note 53 (discussing various considerations and conceptualizations
regarding the concept of a marketplace of ideas invoked by the Supreme Court across a range
of cases).
350
See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (holding that intentional lies spread on the airwaves were not protected by the First Amendment); St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (holding that unintentional purveyors of falsities should
be protected by the First Amendment); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 300–01 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 702 (1931).
351
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 772
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not seek to make philosophical contributions, but rather communicated these themes
as they sought to rationalize precedential conclusions in First Amendment cases.352
A. The Value of Truth and Falsity
Justices conveyed consistent concern about the value truth and falsity offer in
democratic discourse.353 This concern came in two different, but related, forms. First,
Justices generally communicated false facts have no value, while false ideas, which
they understood as being synonymous with unpopular ideas, can be valuable to society.354 Such a dichotomy aligns with the second theme regarding the Court’s concerns
about the value of truthful or false communication, which dealt with assessments of
whether the messages were a public good or a matter of public concern.355 Justices
have often intertwined these concerns in the same passage, conveying understandings that falsity does not contribute to the public good and therefore does not have
value.356 In Hustler v. Falwell in 1988, the Court explained, “False statements of fact
are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”357 Fourteen years earlier, the Court concluded in Gertz that “there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”358 In the same passage, the
Court explained, “Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public
issues.”359 Similarly, in the 1976 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. commercial speech decision, the Court explained,
“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake.”360 Justices concluded commercial speech can contribute to democratic society,
(1984) (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496
(1975) (voicing reluctance to bar media access to materials that would inform but scandalize
its audience); St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
352
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and therefore has value.361 Finally, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps in
1986, the Court reasoned those who claim they have been defamed must carry the
burden of proving what was published was false.362 In rationalizing such a conclusion, the Court explained, the Constitution requires Justices to tip the scales “in favor
of protecting true speech” and “[t]o ensure that true speech on matters of public
concern is not deterred.”363
In each of these cases, Justices communicated understandings that truth and
falsity should be evaluated based on the value they contribute to society.364 These
conclusions came in the form of explicit findings that false statements of fact are
valueless and related, more nuanced, discussions of the potential goodness, as a type
of synonym for value, the ideas might contribute to society.365 The relatively explicit
statements about the value of intentionally false information can be contrasted with
the Court’s consistent conclusion that “[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea.”366 Similarly, the Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc. in 1984 reasoned, “The First Amendment presupposes that
the freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and
thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the
vitality of society . . . .”367 Thus, the Court has associated ideas with having intrinsic
value.368 False statements of fact, however, are of “such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.”369
While the Court was consistent in these conclusions for more than half a century, Justices in Alvarez removed and reframed such a concern for the value of speech
in regard to truth and falsity. The Court concluded criminalizing false factual statements
that are made with the intent to mislead people was a content-based restriction.370
The Court reasoned, “falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the
First Amendment.”371 Instead, the Court reasoned falsity and some other factor, such
as damage to reputation or fraud, would be needed to justify a narrow restriction on
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false expression.372 Otherwise, “open and vigorous expression of views in public and
private conversation” requires striking down a law that criminalizes false statements
of fact that are meant to mislead.373 Absent from the Court’s decision were concerns
about the valueless nature of intentional false statements of fact.374 Thus, Alvarez
conflicts with the otherwise consistent value-related concerns the Court has communicated in rationalizing a separation regarding false facts and false ideas.375
B. A Matter of Intent
Despite the Court’s decisions to reject intent-based “good motives” and “justifiable ends” tests that were found in early cases such as Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson
and Beauharnais v. Illinois,376 Justices have continued to communicate concern regarding the intent of the speaker or publisher when examining truth and falsity issues
in First Amendment decisions. This concern is perhaps most apparent in the Court’s
defamation decisions.377 The landmark New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ruling drew
the actual malice concept into the Court’s reasoning, and in doing so made intent part
of how truth and falsity are understood in a large group of First Amendment cases.378
The Court reasoned a public official can win a defamation claim if they establish the
publisher acted “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.”379 Later that year, in the Garrison v. Louisiana defamation decision, Justices emphasized unintentional falsity is unavoidable and should be protected, but “knowing or reckless falsehood” should not be.380 The Court brought these
intent-related ideas into a broadcast context in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. in
1971.381 Justices emphasized a “[c]alculated falsehood, of course, falls outside” First
Amendment protection.382 Instead, the Court weighed whether the broadcaster “negligently failed to ascertain the truth,” considering the report’s sources and informationgathering processes.383 The Court explained a defamation conviction can be “sustained
only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published
372
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with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.”384 Justice Harlan was not satisfied with the Court’s reasoning, offering an intentfree approach.385 In his dissent, he averred, “Where the State cannot point to any
tangible danger, even knowingly erroneous publication is entitled to constitutional
protection.”386 His conclusion aligns more closely with the Court’s reasoning in
Alvarez, where Justices explicitly acknowledged the speaker meant to lie and intended to mislead, but concluded his expression must be protected.387
Such examples of intent-free opinions regarding truth and falsity are in the
minority.388 Justices reinforced and built upon the majority’s intent-focused reasoning from Rosenbloom in Gertz three years later.389 Justices explained, “there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact,” as the Court had in preceding cases,
but added careless errors are also without value.390 Justices reasoned, however, erroneous statements must be protected to avoid chilling speech and communicated concern that, if too much protection is given to private reputation, publishers who take
“every reasonable precaution to ensure . . . accuracy” could still face massive damages.391 Thus, those who intend to communicate truthful information but fail should
be protected.392 The reasoning was similar to the Court’s conclusion in St. Amant v.
Thompson in 1968, which emphasized that a person who publishes “in good faith
and unaware of its probable falsity,” should be safeguarded.393 Similarly, in Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. in 1991, Justices reinforced the actual malice standard
from Sullivan, but said that judges should avoid the term when working with juries.394
Instead, they should frame jury instructions as “publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.”395 Thus, the Justices generally communicated concern for the intent of the publisher, seeking to construct a
barrier of protection for accidental error but, aside from Justice Harlan’s Rosenbloom
dissent and the Court’s decision in Alvarez, they otherwise left intentionally false
communication unprotected.396 In doing so, the Court has placed questions about the
communicator’s intent into the heart of any discussion of truth and free expression.397
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The Court’s conclusion in Herbert v. Lando in 1979 represented this dynamic.398
Justices explained “some error is inevitable,” but previous decisions have limited
“liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present.”399
C. The Nature of the Thing
Justices did not delve into philosophical discussions regarding truth but, in rationalizing their decisions in cases dealing with truth, falsity, and free expression, communicated important assumptions about how they understood the nature of truth.400
Justices consistently communicated understandings that the flow of information and
truth are inexorably connected.401 They conveyed concern about self-censorship if
defamation standards were too easily met and generally contended truth and false
statements can be proven or identified from each other.402 Such conclusions, while
they do not hang their hat on a single outlook on the nature of truth, indicate significant
agreement among Justices regarding human rationality and its relationship with truth.403
Essentially, Justices conceptualized the apprehension of truth as something that
requires information and that truth is well-sourced and verifiable.404 While this association between information and truth appears to align with marketplace assumptions,
Justices were not consistent in how they framed the nature of truth.405 While they placed
significant faith in human rationality, they did not always associate Enlightenment
objective and universal truth with their conclusions.406 In Garrison, for example, the
Court found “utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas
and the ascertainment of truth.”407 Such an emphasis on ascertaining truth, rather
than discovering it, leaves the door open for different understandings about truth.408
Similarly, in St. Amant, the Court combined “ascertainment and publication of the
398
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truth about public affairs” into the same statement, linking rationality and truth.409
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in the Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission case, rejected absolute truth as the purpose of the
First Amendment.410 He explained, “The free flow of information is important in this
context not because it will lead to the discovery of any objective ‘truth,’ but because
it is essential to our system of self-government.”411
Justices conveyed concern for the flow of information and human conclusions
regarding what is true.412 What form that truth took, objective or more emergent, was
not consistently indicated.413 This does not mean Justices did not communicate these
rationales without an assumption about the objective or subjective nature of truth in
mind.414 Instead, it contends that they consistently communicated concern for information flow and human rationality when conveying their understandings of truth.415
In Beauharnais, Justice Jackson dissented when the Court upheld Illinois’s group
libel law.416 He contended Beauharnais never had a chance to prove his ideas were
true or, more importantly, as a result of the decision, future ideas will be limited “instead of being received and evaluated.”417 A decade later, Justices in Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board upheld the board’s right
to require a group to register as a Communist entity.418 In its reasoning, the Court
weighed whether “an informed American observer, in the exercise of independent
judgment and sensitive to the best interests of the United States, might not also
reasonably have arrived at the view held by the Party.”419 In Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court reasoned commercial speech is protected because of “its contribution to the flow of accurate and
reliable information relevant to public and private decision-making.”420 Rationales
such as these emphasize protecting the flow of information, indicating truth and
409
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information are related.421 They do not, however, require that such truth be objective
and universal.422 Instead, Justices communicated they understood truth as something
that requires information.423 Their rationales regarding the nature of truth do not
communicate truth is emergent or malleable, but neither do they explicitly require
absolute, universal truth.424
Aside from Chief Justice Rehnquist’s conclusions, the absence of a consistent
and explicit discussion of a specific understanding about the nature of truth in Justices’ free-expression rationales does not mean they did or did not accept traditional
Enlightenment assumptions that have been used to undergird the marketplace.425 The
absence of such explicit supports, however, means that no established conceptualization of truth stands in the way of revisions regarding truth and twenty-first-century
understandings of free expression.426
CONCLUSION
The word “truth” does not appear in the First Amendment.427 Truth has become,
however, a foundational tool for how Justices communicate how they understand free
expression and how they justify extending First Amendment safeguards—often striking
down state and federal laws in the process.428 Justices have not selected just any
version of truth.429 Beginning in 1919, Justices started weaving an Enlightenmentfounded conception of truth into their free-expression rationales.430 By the 1960s,
421
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Enlightenment-based rationales for free expression had been installed in the marketplace of ideas approach, making them the dominant conceptualization for free expression.431 Enlightenment truth, however, comes with significant conceptual baggage,
the weight of which has become increasingly unwieldy in the twenty-first century
as networked technologies have fundamentally changed how people communicate
and, crucially, understand the world around them.432 This Article identified fundamental problems with the foundational truth assumptions the Court has used to
support its First Amendment rationales and identified conceptual building blocks of
alternative understandings of truth.433 It has also examined how the Supreme Court has
articulated understandings of free expression and truth, ultimately seeking alternative rationales for First Amendment protections in a significantly changed, and changing, information environment.434 Crucially, elements for such revisions already exist
within the Court’s discourse and find substantial support in philosophical conceptualizations of truth.435
The Enlightenment-based truth rationales provide a faulty foundation upon which
to construct First Amendment rationales in the twenty-first century.436 They must be
replaced, like expired batteries, with truth assumptions that recognize the self-referential, personal nature of how citizens come to understand the world around them.437
They must also be replaced with discourse-based assumptions that add concern for
community and the development of truth, via consensus and interaction among citizens,
to the more phenomenological building blocks regarding the personal nature of truth.438
Using such conceptual building blocks, those in which truth is more synonymous with
meaning-making and understanding than it is with absolute certainty and a competition between truth and falsity, would allow for meaningful, but not radical, revisions
to free-expression rationales, and thus the flow of information in the networked era.
As rationales for free expression, these assumptions would reinforce existing
Supreme Court opinions in which Justices contended steps much be taken to protect
the marketplace from harm. Justices disagreed, primarily beginning with CBS v.
Democratic National Committee, in a variety of cases regarding whether a wideopen marketplace, one that places a premium on encouraging as much information as
possible, or a protected marketplace, one that allows limited regulation to safeguard
the flow of information from distortion, best aligned with the First Amendment.439
431
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Working from fundamentally flawed Enlightenment assumptions that truth generally
vanquishes falsity in a free exchange of ideas, a majority of Justices eventually sided
with the wide-open marketplace, thus, for example, striking down campaign finance
regulations, allowing corporations human-like free-speech protections, and vastly expanding commercial speech rights.440 A shift that reconceptualizes truth as a liquid
rather than a solid, something that is formed and changes, via discourse with others
and internal, personal processes, would buttress arguments that the marketplace must
be protected from distortion. Such an understanding would also align more closely
with the conceptualizations of truth that Justice Holmes, who introduced the marketplace concept into the Court’s vocabulary in 1919, communicated in his legal and personal writings.441 In his article Natural Law, published a year before his groundbreaking
First Amendment–related opinions in 1919, Justice Holmes explained, “[W]hen differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him
have his way. But that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, so far as appears, his
grounds are just as good as ours.”442 Justice Holmes understood truth as something
personal and subjective, which can lead individuals to come to different conclusions
about reality.443 An approach to truth that is more aligned with these understandings,
which encompass more process- and discourse-based approaches would include, for
example, upholding carefully tailored limitations on artificially intelligent communicators that, as a result of their nonhuman nature, can push human speakers from the
marketplace and create false impressions that a consensus has been reached regarding an issue.444 Similarly, such an adjustment in truth foundations would allow a different outcome in a case similar to Citizens United, where lawmakers sought to protect
the marketplace from distortion, but Justices, drawing from Enlightenment assumptions about truth, struck down such limitations.445 More broadly, reconceptualizing
truth foundations in free-expression rationales would better align with the fragmented
and polarized nature of online discourse in which truth can vary significantly from
community to community.446
Such a careful, nuanced shift in foundational assumptions would not be a significant departure from the Court’s concerns.447 Aside from opinions that support
440
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safeguarding the marketplace, rather than encouraging maximum information protection, Justices communicated in cases that concerned free expression and truth that
protecting its space and flow were of primary concern.448 Justices communicated
understandings that the value of the speech, the intent of the speaker, and the nature
of the ideas were crucial considerations when evaluating free-expression claims.449
While these concerns were viewed from generally Enlightenment-based lenses, a
shift to an understanding of truth that is more discursive and phenomenological in
its assumptions would not change the Court’s concerns regarding the value, intent,
and nature of the expression. In other words, it would not shift what Justices evaluate.
It would, however, influence how the Court evaluates free-expression claims. Justices
might be led to consider how a law influences the flow of information and the health
of the marketplace, rather than whether it allows the maximum potential information
to be communicated. Absent assumptions about truth vanquishing falsity, Justices
would be more likely to consider protecting the ability of individuals to encounter
ideas and conduct discourse about issues they face so truth can emerge via consensus or understanding among communities. Such communities can thus work with
others to create solidarity and affect change in democratic society.
Ultimately, this Article emphasizes that the Enlightenment truth assumptions that
have come to appear as weathered and timeless as the original version of the Constitution in the National Archives, have only been in place as primary rationales for free
expression since the 1960s.450 They are not original to the document Justices interpret
when they evaluate First Amendment questions and were not present in Justice
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams or similar cases that followed. Instead, they are a set of
lenses that, in light of significant changes in the flow of information and how individuals understand themselves and others, have come to skew judicial interpretations in
unproductive ways.451 A careful renovation of these foundational, supporting understandings of truth, which buttress free-expression rationales, could provide a stronger set of rationales for free expression in the twenty-first century.
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